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Abstract 
Indian planning though sought to effect parity 
between regions inequality has widened during the 
last 50 years. Agricultural growth, its linkages with 
industry, the saving-ratio, factors of endogenous 
growth, differential labour productivity, and the 
locational advantages of manufacturing, seem to have 
limited explanatory roles. The distortions cannot be 
ascribed also to State intervention as against the 
rule' of the market'. In fact, the labour process 
control by regional literacy and similar custom, and 
the proximity to state politics induce indigenous 
large industrial houses to concentrate their 
investments in the 'home' states, while not all of the 
states are equally endowed with big entrepreneurs. 
The restricted labour migration from, thus could 
hardly reverse the capital flow to, high-
unemployment and low-income regions. 
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1: Introduction 
As part of its commitment to equity and social 
justice, planning in India has sought to effect parity between 
regions. The First Plan stated: 
The excessive concentration of industries brings in 
its train certain economic and social disadvantages 
and a wider diffusion of industry is desirable from 
this larger point of view. Further, if industrial 
This is a revised version of the paper 
presented at the National Conference on Fifty Years 
of Indian Economic Development and Regional 
Imbalance', held at Jadavpur University, March 21-
22, 1997. In particular, I would like to thank 
Santosh Bhattacharya for asking searching questions, 
in the Conference. I am also grateful to Dhiresh 
Bhattacharya and Nirmal Kumar Chandra for 
comments on the penultimate draft. Needless to say 
I alone am responsible for the errors that may 
remain. 
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development in the country is to proceed rapidly and 
in a balanced manner, increasingly greater attention 
will have to be paid to the development of those 
States and regions which have so far remained 
backward (Planning Commission, 1952: Vol. II, para 
49). 
There is the debate as to how far imbalance' is 
inimical to growth. In fact, imbalance is intrinsic to 
capitalist economic development. Imbalance across 
countries, between agriculture and industry, and in income 
and wealth distribution have been presumed to be the major 
sources of economic development ever since capitalism 
evolved as a system of production. The capitalist market 
system is assumed to have the capacity to remove 
imbalances while, in fact, it has reinforced the latter. It is 
only when ihe post-colonial nation-states attempted to resist 
the global market forces with the nationalist agenda we 
witness the poles of development outside 'West'. The post-
1949 Chinese model of balanced development— balance 
between agriculture and industry, rural and urban, heavy and 
light industries, and so on -- was a marked departure from 
even the socialist plan model of USSR. 
In India, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 laid 
down the State policy of reducing disparities in levels of 
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development. Further, the post-colonial State in its 
endeavour to reduce regional inequality promised' a fair1 
distribution of public sector investments. Public enterprises 
(central), irrigation, power, transport network, the budgetary 
transfers, all taken together, furnished enough potential to 
offset the market forces leading to cumulative and circular 
causation' a la Mvrdal (1957).1 This paper attempts to 
delineate factors that explain the gap between potential and 
actual. It is our contention that the revenue management 
crisis had actually weakened the strategic capacity of the 
State to govern the market. The regional concentration of 
indigenous' industrial houses, their differential growth rates, 
and ultimately their respective strength of articulating 
regional interests to the Union Government determined the 
regional pattern of industrial development, while the relative 
weight of agriculture in domestic economy was dwindling 
in most of the states. What emerges is that, given the 
restricted mobility of labour across states and state 
minimalism', the role of the financial institutions becomes 
crucial in regional integration. Here, 'region' is most often 
used synonymously with 'state'. We are aware of the 
nuances; high per capita income in, say, Maharashtra is 
largely a contribution of Mumbai and the coastal belt while 
most of the plateau in the state is relatively underdeveloped. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II 
presents a summary measure of regional divergence. In 
Section III, agricultural growth as a plausible source of 
divergence has been tested. The regional variation in 
forward linkages' of agricultural growth as manifested in 
the growth of unregistered manufacturing has been discussed 
in Section IV. The explanatory roles of regional saving-ratio, 
the factors of endogenous growth, the differential labour 
productivity, and the locational advantages in organized 
manufacturing have been discussed in Section V. In Section 
VI, an attempt has been made to delineate the locational 
pattern of investments by the large industrial houses. The 
analysis has been put in perspective in the concluding 
section. 
II: Inequality 
As the average per capita net state domestic product 
(NSDP) of 23 states (excluding Meghalaya, Nagaland and 
Sikkim) tended to rise over the years, the disparity across 
states, measured in terms of the 'coefficient of variation', 
increased almost at the same rate (Chart l . l ) .2 The rate of 
increase in regional inequality declined during 1980-81 -
1993-94, as the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO)-New 
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Series of NSDP at 1980-81 prices (Chart 1.2) as well as the 
regression analysis would show.3 There is actually a 
downward shift of the 'old series'- curve with the change to 
the New' 1980-81 series. It has been pointed out that the 
estimates of domestic product for some of the unorganized 
sectors have been revised upwards to an extent which is 
very difficult to accept, because of the sudden sharp changes 
introduced. This is also important because many of these 
revisions are based on ' surmises' rather than the use of more 
recent data of sufficient reliability (Datta Roy Choudhury, 
1988). However, there is no denial of the fact that wide 
disparity persists across Indian states. Per capita NSDP (the 
1980-81 Ssenes) of the richest state Delhi was about 4.14 
times more than that of the poorest Bihar in 1980-81; 
thereafter, that shot up to 4.5 in 1991-92. Further, despite 
her considerable agricultural growth West Bengal slid down, 
in the state-rankings of per capita income to 14th in 1990-91 
from 13th in 1987-88 and, from 11th in 1980-81 (Table 1). 
In short, regional disparity is made clear in (a) the widening 
gap between the per capita incomes of the richer and poorer 
states, (b) faster economic growth in some of the states, and 
(c) retardation in other states. 
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Ill: Agriculture 
The general notion is that the inter-state disparity 
largely follows from the differential performance of the 
agricultural sector. Perhaps, agricultural growth across states 
in the 80s has been instrumental, to some extent, in reducing 
the gap' between per capita incomes. The green revolution 
technology that was concentrated in Punjab, Haryana and 
west Uttar Pradesh in the 60s, diffused in a limited manner 
in the 70s, and became almost an all-India phenomenon in 
the 80s, although the rate varied across states. 
It is more pertinent to examine the regional disparity 
with respect to per capita productivity than the per hectare 
productivity. The land-person ratio is a crucial determinant 
of the former. It is only in states like Punjab, Haryana, west 
Uttar Pradesh and, Jammu and Kashmir that impressive 
increases in per capita production took place during the 60s 
and 70s. In Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat the increase had 
been marginal. Maharashtra, Karnataka and Rajasthan 
presented a somewhat stagnant picture. The rest of the 
country, covering the eastern region, Tamil Nadu and Kerala 
in the south, and Madhya Pradesh had experienced a fall in 
per capita production (Knshnaji, 1992). 
Looking at the aggregate performance of agriculture 
at the state level during the immediate post-green revolution 
period i.e., 1968-69 to 1981-82, and during 1981-82 to 
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1990-91 certain broad conclusions may be drawn. The 
tentativeness of the observations arises because of the fact 
that in the absence of the required state-level time series of 
index numbers of area, production and yield per hectare of 
all crops combined, for all the states, the statistical exercise 
is based on SDP originating in agriculture in 15 major states 
(see Sawant and Achuthan, 1995). Nevertheless, as the 
compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) for the two periods 
show, for all the states excepting Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat 
and Maharashtra the rate was higher in the 80s than in the 
earlier period. This had counter-balanced the rising income 
disparity. On the other hand, the rate of agricultural growth 
in the 80s in some of the states like Assam, Bihar and 
Madhya Pradesh was lower than that of population growth. 
Thus, the net impact of agricultural growth on income 
inequality among the states was rather moderate. 
The green revolution that was originally concentrated 
in a few areas having better irrigation infrastructure 
(developed mostly by the colonial government) drew bulk of 
the central government expenditure on agriculture in the 
forms of grants, irrigation projects, and subsidies on inputs. 
These facilitated consolidation of a class of rich peasants, 
and accumulation in the agricultural sector in regions like 
8 
Punjab, Haryana and west Uttar Pradesh. The factors on the 
'supply side' obviously complemented an appropriate 
'receiving system' characterized by the rural class structure 
in these states. To elaborate, for optimum utilization of the 
irrigation potential, particularly of dam irrigation, adherence 
to a suitable cropping pattern -- a mix of paddy, wheat and 
crops in rabi -- is necessary. Many crops could be grown 
with relatively less water and thus total irrigated area could 
be increased. However, so long as the cultivators are 
prevented from exercising their free choice' by the property, 
market and credit relations, the divergence between the 
actual and appropriate crop-mix would be likely to continue. 
Looking at the total expenditure incurred on some of the 
central irrigation projects, their command area development 
(under centrally sponsored schemes), and the percentage of 
utilization of the potential, in different states as quoted in 
the CAG Report (Gol, 1975-76), it appears quite certain that 
pre-capitalist land relations in, say, Bihar inhibited the 
expected outcomes of the huge expenditure on, say, the 
Koshi project; utilization ratio was 18 per cent only. By 
comparison, the utilization ratio for Bhakra Nangal project 
in Punjab was about 66 and in Haryana 121 per cent. 
Above all, the relative importance of agriculture itself 
had been declining in most of the states, as is evident from 
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the declining ratio of NSDP originating in agriculture to that 
of manufacture (Chart 2). Only in Assam, Bihar, Rajasthan 
there was no pronounced trend of declining share of 
agriculture, while in Punjab and Onssa the ratio increased 
since 1979-80 after initial declines. 
On the whole, the observed trend of disparity across 
states does not have any direct correspondence with that of 
agricultural growth. As demand for consumption as well as 
capital goods increase due to commercialization of local 
agriculture there would be inducement to set up 
manufacturing units in the vicinity. However, the large scale 
manufacturing units set up in a few places in the country are 
capable of catering to most of the micro-regional demands, 
hence they would not necessarily lead to local 
manufacturing. In general, with increased commercialization, 
the outflow of agricultural savings augments the supply of 
venture capital to manufacture. But, this process has 
negative impacts as well. The outflow by discouraging 
investment and technological innovation in agriculture may, 
in the long run, have the retardation effect on value added. 
However, this is also true that investment opportunity per 
holdings is limited by the size of land-holdings. Punjab 
having higher proportion of large farms than in other parts 
of the country provides far greater opportunities to plough 
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back agricultural surplus than others. This perhaps explains 
why steady agricultural growth in Punjab is accompanied by 
a rising trend of the agriculture-manufacture ratio. 
Secondly, not all of the value added in agriculture 
accrues to the cultivating households. Depending on the 
prevailing land ownership pattern, absentee landlordism, and 
the credit institution, substantial parts of agricultural surplus 
may have been consumed as rent and interest without any 
discernible increase in capital accumulation in agriculture. 
The private moneylenders in the informal rural credit market 
charging 4-12 per cent per month as interest rate pump out 
substantial volume of incomes, which may or may not have 
constituted savings, of the small and marginal peasant 
households. On the whole, whether surplus outflow from 
agriculture is tenable or not for aggregate development 
depends on a host of factors. However, the fact remains that 
a substantial part of the agricultural surplus is being 
transferred to non-agriculture via the financial institutions. 
The data on state-wise scheduled commercial banks' 
(the giants among them are of course nationalized) yearly 
advances to agriculture show that certain states benefit more 
than the others. So far as the direct finance to farmers is 
concerned, states such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and 
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Haryana have been the principal beneficiaries (RBI, Banking 
Statistics). Throughout the 1980s, the direct finance (short-
term and term loans) to agriculture by the scheduled 
commercial banks as a proportion of the aggregate value of 
agricultural outputs, in any particular year, in West Bengal -
- when her agricultural growth, especially of rice appeared 
to be substantial, about six per cent CAGR as compared to 
the all-India average of 3.34 per cent — was far less than in 
those states (Table 2), The 'logic' of efficient allocation of 
scarce resources in a few selected agricultural (wheat) zones 
perhaps could be tenable in the 60s but not in the 80s when 
the technology' had spread widely across states, and as the 
question of wheat-rice balance transpired. 
The preponderance of small and marginal cultivators 
in, say, West Bengal agriculture and their perennial 
requirements of credits for production purposes prompt 
increased demand for institutional loans. And, unless that is 
being met by the financial institutions, large part of the 
economic surplus in agriculture would eventually accrue to 
the private moneylenders via usurious interest rate. To make 
the forward linkages of increased commercialization of 
agriculture effective, it is necessary to transfer this part of 
potential economic surplus to the 'town' economy via the 
'interest payment to loans' to especially the semi-urban 
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branches of the scheduled commercial banks. However, the 
data available on deposit and advances made by the public 
and private sector scheduled commercial banks in semi-
urban centres (RBI, Report) tell us: Despite considerable 
growth in West Bengal agriculture during the 80s the credit-
deposit ratio of the rural branches remained much lower than 
the national stipulated (by RBI) average of 60.1 per cent. 
And, that of the semi-urban branches in the state hovered 
around half of the all-India ratio, in any particular year. It 
may be noted further, the credit-deposit ratio of the semi-
urban branches in West Bengal was lowest among the 14 
relatively developed states, in most of the years in the 80s. 
The poor resource mobilization from agriculture by 
the financial institutions, in a situation of credit rationing, 
had implications for the working of small scale industrial 
(SSI) units, bulk of which belong to unregistered 
manufacturing4 and, about 45 per "cent of which in West 
Bengal are located outside the urban and metropolitan 
centres (Gol, 1992: Table 6.2). Per unit fixed investment in 
working SSI units in West Bengal is found to be the second 
lowest (next to Madhya Pradesh) among the 31 states and 
union territories (Gol, 1992: Table 39). Although 
institutional credit availability does not fully explain the 
latter, a comparison of credit flow to the SSI sector and their 
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relative performance in terms of fixed capital and output in 
various states obviously points to an association' (Tables 3 
and 4). 
About five per cent of the SSI units in India are 
located in Maharashtra and they engage 14 per cent of all-
India fixed assets in the SSI sector. By contrast, in poorer 
Madhya Pradesh, 13 per cent of the total SSI units employ 
only three per cent of fixed assets. On the whole, the per 
unit fixed assets is found to be much higher in richer states 
like Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu as 
compared to that in the poorer states. It certainly shows very 
little technological integration of the industrial centres with 
their hinterlands. West Bengal is exceptional in the sense 
that though she is considered to be industrially advanced, 
her agricultural growth rate is considerably higher than 
national average, and there is a steady flow of human capital 
resources from some of the country's best technical institutes 
in the state, yet her SSI units are significantly backward, 
technologically. One of the major reasons is the scarcity of 
institutional finance while a considerable part of enhanced 
agricultural surplus goes to capital expenditure on improved 
dwelling units by the dominant marginal and small peasants, 
and to the private moneylenders at usurious interest rates. 
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IV: Unregistered manufacturing 
Chart 3 shows the trend of the SDP-ratio of 
registered to unregistered manufacturing, during 1969-70 -
1986-87. In states such as West Bengal, Onssa, Assam, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, the relative weight of 
unregistered manufacturing, on an average, had been 
increasing. There was no significant rising trend in Punjab. 
By contrast, the ratio had a pronounced rising trend in states 
like Maharashtra, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. The implications of the 
rising share of unregistered manufacturing in some of the 
industrially backward states such as Onssa and Assam are 
different from that, say, in West Bengal having an earlier 
developed industrial base. In the former, it indicates 
transition from agrarian to non-agrarian economic system 
while in the latter case, it is the growing informalisation 
within a relatively developed economic system. 
Faster growth of the unregistered than the registered 
sector perhaps suggests that (a) the industrial sector has been 
unable to generate employment growth at a rate which can 
make any appreciable impact on the high levels of 
unemployment, and (b) the labor-absorptive capacity of 
agriculture has declined. The unregistered production 
organizations provide opportunities for employment as 
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workers or owner-managers. These organizations also 
directly absorb local especially rural investible surplus. 
Some of these organizations use hired labour and attempt 
technical upgradation while others are run with unpaid 
family labour with the sole aim of subsistence. 
The relative weights of the different types of 
unregistered manufacturing units in West Bengal need to be 
determined. This is all the more important since income (or, 
imputed wage) in the family units is quite often lower than 
the prevailing agricultural wages (Banerjee, 1995). More is 
the weight of the family units in the unregistered sector 
lower would be the wage level in the unorganized labour 
market. As a result, less is the inducement to adopt capital-
intensive improved technology in these units. Thus, 
whatever forward linkages that the commercialization in 
West Bengal agriculture had in the development of small 
and tiny manufacturing units, turns out to be a short-run 
phenomenon. The unregistered as well as the labor-intensive 
SSI units in the registered sector are generally in the low-
equilibrium trap': low wage does not induce modernization 
which, in turn, shortens the life-span of mostly those units 
which have links with urban industry that demands frequent 
changes in designs and products. As is evident (Gol, 1992: 
Table 5.1), the closed to working SSI units was 80 per cent 
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in West Bengal as against the all-India average of 51 per 
cent.5 This is particularly significant as large numbers of the 
working SSI units in the state located outside the urban and 
metropolitan centres are direct outcome of the agricultural 
performance. And, as it has been observed (in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan) that the units that have strong links with 
urban industry yield higher rate of profit than units which 
have stronger linkages with agriculture (Mukhopadhyay and 
Lim, 1985). 
The latter perhaps explains the development of 
relatively high capital-intensive SSI units in those states viz., 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra which had been 
experiencing much lower agricultural growth than the 
national average in the 80s. Punjab, on the other hand, the 
foremost green revolution state, witnessed a rise of SSI units 
which constitute about eight per cent of the all-India 
aggregate. But their weaker links with urban industry results 
in a lower concentration ratio of fixed capital, i.e., six per 
cent (Table 3). 
V: Location of organized manufacturing 
Since its inception planning has been caught in the 
horns of a dilemma. It recognized the difficulties involved 
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in bringing about a relocation of industries. Thus, the 
compulsions of growth conflicted with equity. As the First 
Plan mentioned and subsequent Plan documents endorsed in 
a more or less similar manner: 
The tendency for industries to concentrate 
around certain areas where industrial 
development has already taken place is 
explained by the availability in those areas of 
a large number of external1 economies on 
account of the prior development of ancillary 
services and facilities like banking, transport 
and communications. It is difficult therefore 
in the initial stages to induce pnvate industry 
to choose a new location where such 
facilities are inadequate (Planning 
Commission, 1952: Vol. II, para 49). 
Despite a number of external economies in the 
regions where industrial development had already taken 
place big' capital, in fact, tended to decentralize ever since 
the early days when the Planning Commission perceived it 
to be difficult. In 1950, Bombay and West Bengal together 
used to employ about 59 per cent of the productive capital 
in organized manufacturing in India. Thereafter, the share of 
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these two early developed states declined. And, industrial 
development has become noticeable in states like Tamil 
Nadu, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and 
Karnataka (Table 5).6 The decentralization process across 
states somehow halted in the 70s; the aggregate share of the 
12 states in the all-India ASI-Census sector productive 
capital took a reverse trend. 
The volume of capital invested in manufacturing 
certainly cannot be contemplated as evidence of 
development. Assam for a long time allured foreign as well 
as domestic capital in her tea gardens but ultimately 
remained one of the underdeveloped states in India. Bihar is 
another case in point. For instance, in 1982-83, Bihar 
engaged about 11 per cent of the aggregate productive 
capital in the all-India ASI-Census Sector. Yet, by the index 
of per capita NSDP at 1980-81 prices, she was lowest 
among the 27 states and union territories (Table 1). 
Similarly, while Uttar Pradesh accounted for about 10-11 per 
cent of the aggregate productive capital her rank in the per 
capita NSDP did not improve beyond 25th in the order. 
Thus, the local linkages' of industrial capital through 
upstream' and downstream' enterprises seem to be crucial. 
Regional variation in organized manufacturing is 
often attempted to be explained in terms of resource 
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endowments of the regions. It is very difficult to have 
precise state-wise estimate of savings of the federal state. A 
tentative measure with CSO-esnmates of NSDP and the 
consumption expenditure data of the National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO) is attempted here. The 
principal drawback of comparing these two sets of data is 
that they are of different nature. The estimates of SDP are 
prepared on the basis of income originating approach where 
the measurement corresponds to income originating due to 
factors of production physically located within the 
geographical boundaries of a state and represents the value 
of goods and services produced within the state. As a result, 
this does not tell us about the income accruing to the normal 
residents of the state. The huge foreign remittances, from 
migrant workers in Gulf countries, received by, say, Kerala 
is not accounted for in SDP estimates, thereby understating 
her actual incomes. Similarly, net budgetary transfers from 
Centre to states, and inter-state remittances by migrant 
workers would tend to revise the SDP estimates of income 
and thereby savings. On the other hand, the data on 
consumption expenditure (including durable goods, rents and 
taxes) are based on sample survey of household units. It is 
observed that the NSS consumption estimates for all durable 
goods (particularly, expenditure on TV sets, radios, transport 
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equipment and household electrical appliances) were 
substantially lower than the corresponding CSO estimates 
(Minhas and Kansal, 1989). In that case, the high per capita 
NSDP-states are likely to have even higher per capita 
consumption expenditure than that recorded in NSS Reports, 
and thereby lower saving-ratio. Given these limitations, our 
estimates in Table 6 indicate that had there been no inter-
state transfers the per capita saving-ratio (at 1980-81 prices) 
would have been tentatively so. In other words, the 
estimated savings may be considered as the potential rather 
than actual source of investments, in respective states. 
The industrially advanced states viz., Gujarat, 
Kamataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamil Nadu 
experienced higher level of savings to income ratio (Table 
6). Poorer Bihar and Rajasthan often had negative saving 
ratio. Yet, Rajasthan has improved her relative position, in 
terms of per capita income, among all the states while Bihar 
could not. Onssa had a relatively high saving ratio yet she 
is not only industrially backward; her rank among the states 
dwindled. It is mostly the public sector enterprises that 
constitute the base of industries in Onssa. Again, West 
Bengal with moderately high saving ratio and wider 
industrial base still has been losing to other states. Thus, in 
some of the states, industrial growth is found to have 
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positive correlation with saving-ratio while for many others 
this was not so. 
Technical progress as an inevitable byproduct of the 
processes of capital accumulation, however, has been 
contested by the New Growth Theory (NGT). One of the 
crucial hypotheses of the latter is that the size of human 
capital (especially, scientists, engineers and technicians) in 
the society explains the difference between the rich and poor 
nations. So long as industrial labour is not mobile across 
states, as it is often the case in India, certain conclusions of 
NGT appear relevant in explaining regional divergence. 
The precise estimate of total stock and the 
economically active stock of scientific and technical (S&T) 
personnel, in India, are not available. Another problem was 
that S&T personnel were not only engaged in S&T activities 
but were engaged in multifarious activities like production, 
teaching, extension, management, administration, quality 
control, banking etc. Thus a head count of total stock of 
S&T personnel is not very much meaningful. Moreover, as 
opposed to Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) argues that growth 
is not an outcome of human capital accumulation as such, 
but of the invention of increasingly productive techniques. 
Research and Experimental Development (R&D) is a 
systematic and creative work undertaken in order to increase 
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the stock of knowledge and use of this knowledge to devise 
new applications for increasing productivity, decreasing 
production costs, develop new products and processes etc. 
Given the limitations of state-wise data, we may use such 
parameter as patents and knowhow developed, in each state, 
as measure of the output of R&D out of the stock of human 
capital (Table 7). Reading Table 7 along with Table 5 one 
may have explanation of — ignoring the causality ~ the high 
concentration of organized manufacturing in states like 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. However, it becomes difficult 
to explain the steady decline of West Bengal's share, the 
industrial backwardness of Kerala, or the differential rate of 
industrial growth in Karnataka and Gujarat. It may be 
further noted that the lower incidence of industrial 
development in Delhi despite the largest number of patent 
applications from there is attributable largely to the location 
of most of the head offices of public sector units with 
significant R&D activities, there. 
Differential labour productivity across states also 
appears to have limited explanatory capacity. It is argued 
that the labour productivity is higher in the developed 
locations. However, it is meaningless to express labor 
productivity at the state-level' by any single figure; as if 
there is a single decision unit' at the meso-level 
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manufacture. Productivity varies across firms. Productivity 
of labour cannot be measured in isolation from that of the 
capital. Also, labour productivity is positively associated 
with the level of output (frequently referred to as Verdoorn's 
Law). The total factor productivity (TFP) may be a good 
measure to see whether the regions differ significantly. 
However, so long as TFP approach assumes full 
employment of resources, perfect competition, and ignores 
altogether the role of demand factors it has serious 
limitations. The growth process throughout the modern 
history of capitalism has been one of unbalanced growth in 
which some sectors decline in importance while others grow. 
It has been the rapid growth industries that have experienced 
relatively high rates of growth of TFP and technical 
progress, which makes it difficult to define the cause-effect' 
relation. By this count, West Bengal having high 
concentration of jute textiles, or Maharashtra that of cotton 
textiles is almost certain to have performed badly until 
recently. 
Roy (1997), using ASI-data and input-output 
framework, however, has shown that there was negative 
productivity growth of the input-bundle to the extent of 2.5 
per cent in 20 out 23 states, during 1969-70 - 1985-86. The 
exceptions were: Gujarat, Chandigarh and Assam. 
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The modern theory of location, starting with Alfred 
Weber, places emphasis mainly on costs of transport. This 
together with differences in labour cost giving rise to 
'agglomeration factors' gave a basis for determining 
locations that would yield a greater profit (Fnednch, 1929; 
Hirschman, 1958; Hoover, 1975). The establishment of the 
Indian Iron and Steel Co (IISCO) and the Tata Iron and 
Steel Co (T1SCO) in the vicinity of raw materials in Bengal 
and Bihar is understood, and, for that matter the 
concentration of engineering industry in Bengal during the 
colonial period. But that does not explain the growth of 
cotton textiles in Bengal when it had no definite raw 
material advantage. Or, why were Bombay and Calcutta, and 
not sites in the vicinity of the repository of coal, iron ore, 
bauxite, etc., the earliest locations of factory-based 
industries? 
The Webenan framework basically intends to explain 
the pure market' phenomenon and does not considers the 
political and institutional constraints. For example, the plant-
location of the Maruti Udyog Ltd (a public sector joint 
venture) at Gurgaon (adjacent to Delhi) was seriously 
questioned by its collaborator (Suzuki Motor Corporation) 
on the ground that bulk of the market then was in western 
and southern India, and the transport costs of cars from plant 
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to those states would be substantial. However, the techno-
economics was superseded by other considerations. It is also 
futile to search the economic rationale of the location choice 
in the central public service sector: Why the head quarters 
of the University Grants Commission (UGC), Indian Council 
of Social Science Research (ICSSR), National Concil of 
Education Research and Training (NCERT) and vanous 
other central bodies of education are in Delhi instead of 
being located in a more central place like, say, Bhopal in 
Madhya Pradesh? Or, why the head quarter of the Council 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is not located 
near the prime industrial zones in India such as 
Maharashtra-Gujarat, Tamil Nadu-Karnataka, or West 
Bengal? 
According to the ' circular and cumulative causation' 
model of Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1970), free working of 
the market forces lead to the clustering of increasing returns 
activities in certain areas of the economy. The influence of 
growth in the developed regions upon the rate of growth of 
lagging regions operates through spread and backwash 
effects. The scale of the 'backwash' will depend inter alia on 
(i) the initial national and regional location patterns in early 
industrialization, (ii) the force of other factors contributing 
to interregional divergence such as centripetal flow of 
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capital and labour (particularly, skilled), and (iii) the time-
period in which such divergence is not checked or offset by 
government policies (Holland, 1976). The limitation of the 
Myrdal-Kaldor type analysis is that factors such as the 
extraneous discrepancies in capital productivity can also 
generate regional inequality. Disparities in productivity (and 
growth rate) of capital may arise because various regions 
specialize in different basic' products, or because demands 
for these products grow at differential rates. New centres of 
agglomeration may develop on the basis of newer products 
whose demand is growing faster, while the composition of 
products in the older centre of agglomeration may become 
archaic. The concentration of traditional jute textiles (a 
sinking industry) in West Bengal, of chemical-based 
industries (moderate growth) m Maharashtra and Gujarat 
since the late 60s, or computer software production (faster 
growth) in Karnataka since the mid-1980s, and their 
disparate growth rates largely explain the regional 
divergence. 
Under free market conditions, one may thus find 
explanations of regional divergence, though the timing of 
development of a particular location remains undefined. The 
Government of India and the Planning Commission, 
however, from the very beginning were committed to 
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reducing regional disparity. The licensing system was one of 
the crucial instruments in the hands of the central 
government towards that end, until the 1991-liberalisation. 
The credit flow by such large all-India financial institutions 
as Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) was equally 
important, which only followed the pattern of distribution of 
industrial licenses. 
VI: Corporate investment behaviour 
The industrial investments by big business houses in 
India are found to be regionally concentrated. Most of the 
Gujrati (e.g., Kasturbhai, Kilachand, Mafatlal, Sarabhai, 
Walchand) investments are concentrated in the Maharashtra-
Gujarat region, most of the Punjabi investments (excepting 
those by Thapar and Mahindra) in the Punjab-Delhi region, 
Parsi (e.g., Tata) and Maharashtnan (e.g., Kirloskar) 
investments mainly in Maharashtra,7 while the Southern 
houses (e.g., Chidambaram, Chettiar, Iyengar, Ramaknshna) 
are confined primarily to the southern region. The Marwari8 
investments (e.g., Birla, JK, Bangur, Modi, Bajaj, Goenka, 
Sahu Jain) were, however, diversified in states covering 
West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh 
and Bihar. Nevertheless, the largest part of the Marwan 
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investments was initially lodged in West Bengal (Banerjee, 
1988). 
Of the Marwari business houses, the major part of 
investments of the Birlas, Sahu Jains, Dalmias, Bangur 
Somanis, Goenkas, Bajoria Jalans, Jaipunas and Soorajmull-
Nagarmulls were located in eastern India in general and 
West Bengal in particular, at least up to the mid-1960s.9 
Major part of the aggregate turnover of the Marwari 
business houses in this region were from the traditional 
industries, such as jute and cotton textiles, paper, cement 
and tea manufacturing. And most of the firms of the houses' 
having substantial assets were located in West Bengal. 
In eastern India, especially West Bengal, as long as 
the import substitution phase was not complete and foreign 
capital remained dominant, the region remained industrially 
attractive. But with the displacement and decline of 
European capital and the obsolescence of the product mix 
that the region used to produce, the industrial sector of the 
region plunged into a crisis. The Marwan industrial houses 
who replaced the British had neither the legitimacy nor the 
hegemonic position to be the representative of the region. 
They could neither identify with, nor project the aspirations 
of the region. This may explain the fluidity' of their capital 
as compared with other houses. 
29 
On the one hand, big' capital tended to decentralize, 
particularly in the 60s. On the other hand, the rate of 
diffusion was not the same in all the directions (state-wise). 
Given the regional distribution of capital of the large 
industrial houses, this is tantamount to saying that the 
differential industrial growth rate of the states followed the 
differential rate of accumulation of the industrial houses. 
The Industrial Planning and Licensing Policy (1PLP) 
Report (1967, Vol. II: Part V, Statement XV) compiled the 
data on state-wise and product-wise applied for and 
approved licensed investments' for the business houses, for 
the period 1959-66.10 Accepting the limitations of the data, 
we may make certain observations. First, the business 
houses that had major investments in eastern India were 
trying to diversify investments to other regions. Second, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and even underdeveloped 
Uttar Pradesh attracted industrial investments more, as it is 
found that almost all of the business houses applied for 
substantial licenses in those states. Third, in allocating 
licenses, the licensing authority followed a discriminatory 
policy with respect to different industrial houses. This is 
evident from the ratio of approved investment to total 
investments applied for by various business houses in 
various states. While Tata and Sarabhai, for example, were 
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approved 66.5 and 91.3 per cent, respectively, of the total 
investments applied for projects to be located in 
Maharashtra, the Birlas, the Sahu Jains or the Goenkas were 
approved about 36, 35 and five per cent respectively in that 
state, during 1959-66. 
Since the Third Plan an industrial restructuring was 
taking place in India. The types of industries which were set 
up in different locations at that time enjoyed the advantages 
of technology-leadership with a pretty long time-lag before 
others could emulate. Thus it was the allocation of licenses 
for newer branches of production viz., chemicals (especially, 
petro-based), various machinery including electrical along 
with the complementary credit allocation by the all-India 
financial institutions largely determined the future course of 
regional development in the corporate sector. For example, 
there were six applications for investments in petrochemicals 
in Assam (having substantial oil reserves) during 1959-66 
involving about Rs 240 million, instead only two projects 
were approved the costs of which were about Rs 80 million. 
There was only one application for petrochemical project in 
West Bengal the cost of which was estimated at Rs 115 
million, but that was not approved.11 Though there were 
applications for such type of projects from Bihar, none was 
approved. However, 16 projects for Maharashtra and two for 
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Gujarat got the approval of the authorities. 
Among other big business houses in West Bengal the 
Birlas had the lion's share of investments. Thus industrial 
growth in the state was to a large extent related to the 
investment pattern of this particular house. During 1959-66, 
the Birlas applied for 683 licenses whereas only 364 projects 
got approval. The applied-to-approved ratio was also low for 
some other houses whose businesses were concentrated in 
the Eastern region. It is true that multiple applications for 
the same product and for a wide variety of products were 
meant to foreclose licensable capacity. It is also true that the 
Birla enterprise does tend to preempt licensable capacity in 
many industries. But, the licensing authority did not have 
enough information at that time about which industrial house 
actually would utilize the licenses properly. Thus 
discrimination without any generally accepted ground in the 
approval of licenses cannot be brushed aside as unimportant. 
It may be seen from the available data on 
investments associated with particular applications for 
different states (1PLP Report, 1967) that the Birlas applied 
for investments in Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal to 
the tune of Rs 2414 million while they sought licenses for 
Rs 3315 million of investments in other states. The 
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approvals, however, were for Rs 1237 million in the eastern 
regional states and Rs 1484 million in other states. If the 
Union Government had perceived that to remove regional 
disparity it was necessary to diffuse Birla's investments to 
other states, then what could explain the high approved-to-
applied ratios for the Birlas in such developed states as 
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu having wider 
industrial bases? These states were by then witnessing large 
investments in the private corporate sector as well as in the 
public sector. On the other hand, there was no significant 
diffusion of investments by the non-Eastern regional houses 
to the underdeveloped states of the Eastern region. 
The process led to consolidation of the trend in the 
following decades. Table 8 records the state-wise location 
pattern of plants of the large industrial houses, in the 90s.12 
Strikingly, despite considerable progress made by these 
business houses over the last 30 years the region-bias 
generally does not show any symptom of dilution. By 
looking at the regional concentration ratio of individual 
houses one can easily locate their regional origin', excepting 
of course the Marwaris. 
Any attempt to relate the regional relocation of 
investments to the variability of infrastructural facilities 
would be misleading. By the Relative infrastructure 
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development index' West Bengal was among the top seven 
states in, say, 1980-81 while Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh or 
Uttar Pradesh was lagging behind (CM1E, March 1997). 
Further, the industrially backward states like Punjab, Kerala 
and Haryana were among the top four states by the index of 
infrastructure. Yet, big capital from the laggard states in 
respect of infrastructure such as Maharashtra and Gujarat 
were not directed to the former states. 
Since the beginning of the 80s almost all of the state 
governments had entered into fierce competition for alluring 
industrial capital to their respective states with grand 
incentive schemes. But it seems the regional literacy and 
similar custom, particularly language and work ethic, 
induced indigenous bourgeoisie to remain confine to their 
respective states. Both the control over the labour process 
and proximity to state politics played crucial roles in the 
technology absorption process, and thereby in locational 
choice. The 'Marwaris' perhaps are the only business 
community in India who have been engaged in a wide range 
of business activities including moneylending across regions 
for quite a long time. And, in the process built up a rapport 
with respective state politics that has eventually facilitated 
their 'mobility'. 
The trend to regional divergence was further 
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accentuated by the direction of foreign direct investment 
(FDls) flows. Since the early 1970s new FD1 inflows were 
directed to technology-intensive sectors such as electrical 
goods, machinery and machine tools, and chemical and 
allied products. These three broad sectors accounted for 
nearly 58 per cent of total FDI in manufacturing in 1980 as 
against 41 per cent in 1964. In traditional industries like jute 
and cotton textiles, paper, etc., the foreign shares depleted 
(Kumar, 1995). Thus, the industrial centres having high 
concentration of the latter industries suffered more. Added 
to this was the direction of FDIs by non-residents of Indian 
nationality/ origin (NRI) (on repatriation as well as non-
repatnation basis) which became quite substantial towards 
the later half of the 1980s (RBI, 1994-95: Vol. II; and. 
EPW, 1997). And, given the regional bias of the indigenous 
business houses it is not very unlikely that the investments 
by the NRI Gujratis, Tamils or Punjabis would be made in 
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu or Punjab, respectively, while most of 
the states cannot boast of such non-resident entrepreneurs. 
VII: Conclusion 
The post-colonial Indian planning exercise epitomize 
the strategic capacity of Indian State to direct the process of 
industrialization. The State did resort to strategic 
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intervention undermining the private corporate sector and 
regional forces without taking to, unlike in the East Asian 
NICs, political closure'. However, as the growth slowed 
down, the gap between plan targets and achievement 
widened, by the mid-1960s she had lost that capacity. On 
the other hand, there emerged the corporate sector as more 
powerful along with the powerful regional class forces 
particularly in the green revolution areas. A more centralized 
political power had attempted to combat the growing socio-
political tensions in different regions in India. Following 
which, there had been increasing dilution of federalism, until 
the late 1980s, in the State management. The provincial 
government's role in industrial development became more 
and more uncertain. This was particularly so as the licensing 
system began to be used more toward political objectives. 
The emergence of an integrated and indigenous bourgeoisie 
in different regions and their relative strength of articulating 
regional aspirations before the Union Government resulted 
in a new set of relationships among the agencies of 
economic development. 
The Centre-state budgetary transfers is a partial 
measure of the phenomenon -- dilution of federalism. In the 
schemes of things laid down in the Indian Constitution, it 
was the Finance Commission, to be appointed by the 
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President every five years or earlier, which it was expected, 
would recommend whatever adjustments in intra-federal 
transfer (actually, from the Centre to the states) of budgetary 
funds were considered necessary to meet the changing 
requirements of the system. However, until the mid-1980s, 
the larger part of the budgetary funds that have gone from 
the Centre to the states were in the form of Plan and 
discretionary (i.e., non-plan, non-statutory) assistance and 
less were transferred in pursuance of the recommendations 
of the Finance Commissions, appointed from time to time 
(Gulati, 1987). In fact, the discretionary transfers amounted 
to nearly one-third of the aggregate budgetary transfers 
during the first three and half decades of planning. In 
absolute terms these transfers amounted to Rs 339,140 
million during 1951-84 (George, 1987). Only since the 
Eighth Finance Commission (1984-89) things began to 
change. Looking at the state-wise per capita discretionary 
transfers over the plan periods (ibid), and relating it to the 
per capita state income, the conclusion becomes quite 
obvious that these transfers were made arbitrarily and did 
widen inter-state disparities. The middle income states 
received less than the high income states and, the low 
income states received less than the middle income states. 
That the latter began to increase dramatically since the 
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Annual Plans (1966-69) is evident from the coefficient of 
variation of per capita discretionary transfers' to different 
states in each of the plan periods.13 
Additionally, investments in public sector enterprises 
(PSUs) also showed an increasing tendency to concentrate 
in the developed states barring those for extraction activities 
in states like Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh (see Public 
Enterprise Survey Report, various issues). While 
Maharashtra drawing of the largest share of investments in 
PSUs (about 19 per cent in 1992-93) is partly explained by 
off-shore oil exploration, the minimal participation of the 
public sector in the low-developed states draws attention. All 
these amount to indicate that the hypothesis: State 
intervention in the market forces resulted in the regional 
imbalance, is rather weak. The central government resource 
flows in fact followed the direction of private big capital, 
since the mid-1960s. On the other hand, migration of labour 
from high-unemployment and low-income regions remain 
restricted not only by the distances to be travelled but also 
by the sons of the soil' strategy in vogue in many of the 
states. Under these circumstances, the post-1991 'State 
minimalism' is bound to reproduce regional imbalances. 
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Notes 
Myrdal (1957) indicates the mechanism of 
inequality in a dynamic framework. It is designed in 
a skeletal structure to which Kaldor (1970) adds 
further substance. 
The state coverage of CSO-data is limited 
before 1969-70. 
1969-70 to 1986-87 ('Old' series at 1970-
71 prices): gt (annual) = 1.76%, R-bar2 = 0.87927, t 
= 11.172 
1980-81 to 1993-94 ( New' series at 1980-81 
prices): g, = 0.63%, R-bar = 0.23027, F (1,12) = 
4.88904, t=2.211; 
Units outside the purview of the Annual 
Survey of Industries. 
The role of the supra-regional factors is 
not however underrated. 
As to the comparability of data, first, the 
CMI covered only 29 groups while ASI covered ail 
the 63 groups of industries. Second, the CMI 
covered factories employing 20 or more workers 
using power whereas ASI (Census) accounts for 
those factories employing 50 or more workers with 
power, or 100 or more without power. Third, there 
were changes in the geographical coverage of the 
surveys. The main changes are the inclusion of 
Saurashtra in the CMI after 1950, of Andhra 
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Pradesh after 1952, of Mysore after 1953, and the 
division of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 
1959. 
The Tata Iron and Steel Co in Bihar is a 
partial exception. 
People who began to migrate in search of 
fortune from the north-western province, Rajasthan 
to the eastern province, Bengal in the late 19th 
century. 
To get a tentative idea about the sources 
of capital accumulation of these "houses' one could 
use either the product-wise turnover vis-a-vis the 
aggregate turnover data, or the data on business-
wise assets. The Report of Monopolies Inquiry 
Commission (1965) gives detailed data. 
The data are (a) partial because items on 
the free list' are excluded altogether, and (b) not 
fully reliable because the information, particularly 
on the size of investments usually mentioned in 
licence applications are preliminary and tentative. 
11 The 'logic' might have been that West 
Bengal had locational disadvantage as compared to 
Maharashtra particularly since the naphtha used to 
be imported from the West. But the point needs to 
be emphasized is against the selective application of 
the locational theory. However, this project, viz., 
Haldia Petrochemicals has been ultimately launched 
in February 1997 as a joint venture of the 
Government of West Bengal with the Soros-
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Chatterjee Inc., USA, with large cost escalation to 
30 billion rupees. 
(1) A few states have been left out for 
the sake of convenience. (2) To the extent the 
companies did not report the location of plants, as it 
happens in a number of cases, the list is tentative. 
(3) We have not included here the foreign (FERA) 
companies, excepting Hindustan Lever, and the 
dominant undertakings' having assets of Rs 10 
million or more. (4) Many of the companies have 
changed their names and, due to mergers, the 
house' composition has also undergone changes, 
during 1990 - 1996. We have enlisted the plant 
locations of those companies (with changed names) 
only which still belong to the same house' as in 
1990. 
Coefficient of variation: Second Plan -
0.5474, Third Plan - 0.6026, Annual Plans - 1.3636, 
Fourth Plan - 0.9506, Fifth Plan - 1.0766, Sixth Plan 
- 1.2490. 
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Table 1: Per Capita Net State Domestic Product (Rs.) 
at 1980-81 Prices 
State 1980-81 1984-85 1987-88 1990-91 
A&N 2613 (5) 2445 (7) 2695 6) 2679 (8) 
APR 1380 (19) 1505 (18) 1530 18) 1752 (19) 
ARD 1571 (13) 1908 (10) 2184 9) 2379 (10) 
ASH 1317 (22) 1457 (19) 1521 19) 1774 (18) 
BHR 917 (27) 999 (27) 979 27) 1177 (27) 
DEL 3797 (1) 3619 (1) 4601 1) 4703 (1) 
GOA 3145 (2) 3313 (2) 3493 2) 4542 (2) 
GDJ 1940 (8) 2304 (8) 1942 11) 2525 (9) 
HPR 1704 (10) 1592 (17) 1818 15) 2098 (11) 
HRY 2370 (7) 2483 (6) 2598 8) 3405 (5) 
J&K 1776 (9) 1759 (13) 1575 17) 1635 (23) 
KAR 1527 (14) 1834 (11) 1909 12) 2024 (13) 
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State 1980-81 1984-85 1987--88 1990-91 
KER 1508 (15) 1435 (20) 1413 (24) 1802 (16) 
MAB 2435 (6) 2576 (5) 2813 (5) 3386 (6) 
MAN 1419 (18) 1607 (16) 1693 (16) 1784 (17) 
MEG 1361 (20) 1385 (21) 1485 (20) 1726 (21) 
MPR 1358 (21) 1293 (25) 1423 (23) 1696 (22) 
NAG 1448 (17) 1806 (12) 2016 (10) 1738 (20) 
ORS 1314 (23) 1210 (26) 1320 (25) 1364 (26) 
PNB 2674 (4) 3011 (4) 3310 (3) 3676 (3) 
PON 3038 (3) 3062 (3) 3309 (4) 3420 (4) 
RAJ 1222 (26) 1379 (23) 1241 (26) 1890 (15) 
SIK 1571 (12) 1919 (9) 2678 (7) 3293 (7) 
TND 1498 (16) 1758 (14) 1821 (14) 2025 (12) 
TRI 1297 (24) 1363 (24) 1470 (21) 1629 (24) 
DPR 1278 (25) 1379 (22) 1455 (22) 1588 (25) 
WBL 1612 ( U ) 1631 (15) 1828 (13) 1917 (14) 
Source: Based on CSO, Estimates of State Domestic Products. 
Notes: 1) A&N-Andanan & Nicobar, APR-Andhra Pradesh, ARU-Arunachal 
Pradesh, ASH-Assan, BHR-Bihar, DEL-Delhi, GUJ-Gujarat, 
HPR-Himachal Pradesh, HRY-Haryana, J&K-Jannu & Kashmir, 
KAR-Karnataka, KER-Kerala, MAH-Maharashtra, HAN-Hanipur, 
MEG-Meghalaya, HPR-Hadhya Pradesh, NAG-Nagaland, 
ORS-Orissa, PNB-Punjab, PON-Pondichery, RAJ-Rajasthan, 
SIK-Sikkii, TND-Tamil Nadu, TRI-Tripura, DPR-Dttar Pradesh, 
WBL-West Bengal; 
2) Figure within parentheses indicates the rank. 
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Table 2: Scheduled commercial banks* credit to 
agricultural sector as percentage of NSDP 
originating in agriculture (at current prices) 
State 1980-81 1984-85 1988-89 1989-90 
APR 13.9 21.1 20.7 -
ASH 4.0 4.0 8.1 8.3 
BHR 4.6 5.2 7.4 10.1 
GDJ 8.3 8.8 13.5 14.6 
HRY 10.3 25.0 17.3 16.3 
HPR 4.2 9.2 10.6 10.7 
J&K 2.6 7.6 3.9 -
KAR 12.3 19.0 25.3 26.3 
KER 11.9 15.8 21.8 21.0 
HPR 5.7 9.9 11.9 14.7 
HAH 8.7 11.3 15.5 14.1 
ORS 4.9 9.3 13.4 10.3 
PNB 13.3 46.2 16.9 15.6 
RAJ 7.4 10.9 12.2 -
TND 19.5 22.4 40.4 47.8 
UPR 5.6 7.5 9.3 10.2 
WBL 5.3 4.7 15.2 8.9 
Sources: For NSDP in agriculture, EPW Research 
Foundation (1996); and, for the credit-data, CMIE 
(February 1997: Table 1.149). 
Note: Includes SBI and its associates, 
nationalized banks, foreign banks, regional 
rural banks and, other scheduled banks. 
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Table 3: Coiparative developient of SSI in the states 
(Per cent) 
State 1972 1987-88 1987-88 
Unit Eip Fixed 
assets 
Produ 
ction 
Unit Eip Fixed 
assets 
Produ 
ction 
Closed T 
Working 
units 
APR 6 5 4 3 7 8 7 9 38 
BHR 4 4 3 3 6 5 4 2 42 
GDJ 7 7 9 8 6 8 10 8 55 
HRY 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 89 
KAR 4 4 4 3 7 7 7 6 36 
KER 4 8 4 4 4 5 4 3 46 
HAH 11 14 21 20 5 10 14 17 36 
HPR 5 4 3 3 13 4 3 5 47 
PNB 10 8 8 9 8 6 6 6 46 
TND 11 13 10 12 10 15 12 11 43 
DPR 9 10 9 8 9 10 11 9 70 
NBL 10 11 9 10 8 9 5 6 80 
Total 84 90 88 87 87 90 87 86 -
All-
India 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 51 
Sources: Gol, DCSSI (1977: Table 4.2); Gol, DCSSI (1992). 
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 5: industry: State-wise productive capital ($age share of all-India) 
State 1950 1955 1960-61 1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 1982-83 1988-89* 
APR - 2.2 4.0 3.6 5.1 4.9 5.2 6.5 
BHR 10.5 13.0 12.8 8.5 7.6 11.9 10.6 7.3 
DEL 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 -
GDJ - - 7.4 6.2 6.2 7.7 9.0 9.2 
KAR 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.9 
KER - - 2.0 1.5 2.3 2.9 2.5 -
HPR 3.0 2.6 2.9 8.2 6.0 6.8 8.1 5.0 
HAH 34.6 27.1 23.7 16.3 17.9 15.5 15.8 16.5 
PNB 1.8 2.1 2.0 5.4 2.6 3.6 4.6 4.6 
TND 10.0 7.3 5.4 8.0 9.8 8.2 6.8 10.7 
DPR 9.6 10.7 6.7 7.6 10.3 10.4 11.4 11.3 
WBL 24.6 21.8 21.8 19.4 13.3 9.6 8.0 6.5 
Total 95.6 91.7 93.2 89.7 87.2 87.6 87.7 
Sources: Gol, Census of Indian Manufactures (CHI), 1946-1958; CSO, 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), Census Sector, 1959 to] 
1982-83; and, CSO, ASI 1988-89: Summary Results for Factory Sector. 
1992. 
Note: * ASI Census plus Sample sectors (Census Sector data are not 
available separately). 
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Table 6 
An Estimate of State-wise Saving-NSDP Ratio (at 1980-81 prices) 
(Per cent) 
State 1967- 1968- 1969- 1970- 1972- 1973- 1977- 1986- 1987-
68 69 70 71 73 74 78 87 88 
APR 34.3 27.5 27.6 27.1 20.2 26.8 22.7 13.4 13.3 
ASM - 18.2 2.8 16.3 21.9 14.1 21.4 20.2 19.3 
BHR 23.7 9.9 -7.1 8.6 -5.7 -16.0 7.7 1.0 -9.0 
GUJ 48.9 38.9 42.5 46.7 23.6 39.4 43.4 40.4 33.8 
J&K 6.2 -8.1 -1.4 6.1 5.9 20.6 30.4 27.1 5.6 
KAR 24.6 29.8 29.0 31.4 22.7 34.7 39.6 35.4 35.0 
KER 43.6 37.2 48.0 42.5 36.7 32.1 26.4 0.5 -0.5 
HAH 45.8 43.6 38.7 42.1 38.1 44.5 43.1 50.1 49.6 
MPR 35.7 18.4 19.7 20.9 12.1 11.6 20.0 10.8 12.7 
ORS 25.4 40.0 37.8 44.2 36.6 34.0 38.6 22.0 20.0 
PNB 41.7 33.6 33.7 23.5 15.2 25.5 33.3 42.1 42.6 
RAJ 15.3 -15.2 -2.6 27.7 -7.9 2.6 -8.4 -7.7 -17.0 
TND - 34.6 39.3 36.0 29.9 27.0 47.3 29.0 30.0 
UPR 25.5 19.4 16.6 16.7 13.9 9.5 8.1 10.6 14.4 
WBL 19.2 21.7 10.1 15.8 5.7 -0.7 23.2 26.9 30.3 
Sources: For per capita NSDP: CSO, Estimates of State Domestic Product, 
as reproduced in Chancihok et al, India Database: The Economy. 
Vol. I (1990); ana, for data on per capita annual consumption 
expenditure at 1980-81 prices, as estimated from various rounds 
of NSSO, Consumer Expenditure Survey, see Datta Roy Choudhury (1993). 
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Table 7 
Applications for patents filed by different states, 1980-81 - 1991-92 
State/Union Territory No. of applications filed 
1980-81 to 
1985-86 
1986-87 to 
1991-92 
Total 
Andhra Pradesh 158 132 290 
Bihar 155 136 291 
Delhi 1605 1897 3502 
Gujarat 343 243 586 
Baryana 58 52 110 
Kamataka 293 335 628 
Kerala 227 250 477 
Hadhya Pradesh 103 141 244 
Maharashtra 1652 1637 3289 
Punjab 64 42 106 
Rajasthan 62 58 120 
Tamil Nadu 664 605 1269 
Dttar Pradesh 244 250 494 
West Bengal 754 591 1345 
Others 127 128 255 
Total 13006 
Source: Computed from Gol, Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Research and Development Statistics 1992-93, 
(1994: Table 45). 
Note: The address of the patentee is the basis of classification 
under different states. 
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